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International Factors Influencing Australian Governments' 
Responses To The Indochinese Refugee Problem
James E. Coughlan
Introduction
The year 1975 was an important year for Australia: the economy 
had plunged into a severe recession, with high unemployment and 
interest rates, the worst since the 1930s depression: the Government 
was rocked by ministerial involvement in a major illegal international 
loans scandal: and a variety of other significant political disruptions, 
which culminated in the most serious constitutional crisis in Australian 
political history— the dismissal by the Governor-General, Queen 
Elizabeth’s representative in Australia, o f the elected Labor Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam. There was one significant international event 
in 1975 which would have major political and social ramifications for 
Australia over the following decades: the revolutionary changes in the 
Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese Governments.
The communist victories in the three countries which used to 
comprise French Indochina triggered two types o f large-scale population 
movements: the forced deurbanization o f Cambodia and government 
population relocation programmes in Vietnam on one hand, and the 
exodus of over two million Indochinese asylum seekers on the other. 
Although the magnitude o f the exodus of Indochinese asylum seekers 
over the past decade and a half is smaller than some of the other 
contemporary refugee crises, its direct effect on the international 
community has been substantial, largely due to the influence o f the 
United States Government. For Australia, the decision to admit almost 
150,000 Indochinese refugees and immigrants in the decade and a half 
since early 1975 has had a significant direct and indirect impact on the 
social fabric o f Australian society.
The aim of this article is to discuss some of the international 
factors which have contributed to Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy 
formulation since early 1975, with only passing attention given to 
domestic considerations. The article also seeks to show that the 
overwhelming determinant of Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy has 
not been domestic or humanitarian considerations, but rather the 
political desires of the Australian Government and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (the Australian equivalent of the US Department 
of State) to improve Australia’s relations with Asia, especially with the 
Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
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Thailand. Thus, like the United States o f America. Australia’s recent 
refugee policy has been more of a foreign policy tool than an implement 
of Government humanitarian concern.
The following section will provide a short background to Australia’s 
overall refugee policy, which will be followed by a discussion of the 
international factors which have contributed to Indochinese refugee 
policy formulation in the three Australian governments since the beginning 
of 1975. The final section presents a brief discussion and conclusion of 
the issues raised.
Background
Australia is a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status o f Refugees, and thus accepts the definition of the term refugee 
encompassed in these United Nations instruments. However, in more 
recent times Australia, as well as other countries involved in Indochinese 
refugee resettlement and the southeast and east Asian countries, has 
narrowed its interpretation of the term refugee. At the same time, 
Australia is incorporating more stringent procedures in the determination 
of refugee status. This modus operandi has been adopted not only in 
order to separate the genuine political refugees from the economic 
migrants amongst the asylum seekers, but more importantly to justify 
publicly the rejection, and possible mandatory repatriation, of asylum 
seekers who, the Government determines, are non-refugees.
Australia’s response to specific refugee situations takes into 
account such factors as the magnitude of the specific refugee problem, 
the region in which the problem occurs and the strength and nature of 
Australia’s relationship with that region, with particular importance 
placed on the relationships with the country of origin and country o f first 
asylum of the asylum seekers. As with the USA, Australia’s refugee policy 
was until recently based upon ad hoc responses to specific refugee 
crises. After a considerable amount of domestic and international 
pressure in 1978 the Liberal Government of Prime Minister, Malcolm 
Fraser, introduced a regular refugee component into Australia’s annual 
immigration programme. The formulation o f a formalized refugee policy 
in the late 1970s was due to a number of factors, the most important of 
which was the growing number of refugee crises around the world and 
the increasing pressure placed on Australia by various governments and 
organisations to resettle refugees.
Australia is in a similar position, with regard to the Indochinese 
asylum seekers, to the other Asian countries, and unlike other Western 
countries, in that it is both a country of first asylum, that is a country 
where asylum seekers initially seek refuge, and a third country, that is 
a country of refugee resettlement. Australia commenced resettling 
Indochinese refugees in 1975, when slightly more than one thousand 
were resettled, though a substantial resettlement programme was not in
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place until 1978, when over seven thousand were accepted. In late April 
1976, almost a year after the communist take-over o f Saigon, the first 
boat carrying Vietnamese asylum seekers arrived on Australia’s northern 
shores, heralding what would be the arrival o f over fifty boats o f first 
asylum Vietnamese boat people during the following five years. In 
addition, since late 1989 three boats carrying Cambodian boat people 
have successfully landed on Australian shores. The unannounced 
arrival o f Indochinese boat people on Australia’s northern shores has 
been a significant factor in the creation of Australia’s policy towards the 
Indochinese refugees.
As a final background issue, at the beginning of 1975, as part of 
the Colombo Plan of which Australia is a member, there were over five 
hundred Indochinese students sponsored by the Australian Government 
attending educational institutions in Australia. The majority of these 
students were from South Vietnam, but also included 19 students from 
North Vietnam and six high school students nominated by the Pathet 
Lao faction in Laos. The Labor Government under the Prime Minister, 
Gough Whitlam, had established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam 
in 1973, and had actively worked to improve relations between Australia 
and North Vietnam. Following the changes o f government in the three 
Indochinese countries in 1975 Australia continued to provide a small 
amount of developmental and humanitarian aid to Laos, although 
similar aid and cultural exchanges between Australia and the Socialist 
Republic o f Vietnam were suspended in early 1979 following Vietnam ’s 
intervention in Cambodia, influenced by the perception that Vietnam 
was both profiting from and forcibly expelling Vietnamese boat people. 
However, since 1983 Australia has been involved in providing bilateral 
and multilateral humanitarian aid to Vietnam, and there have been a 
small number of cultural exchanges. Australian businesses have also 
been active in assisting Vietnam.
The Whitlam Government’s Neglect: 1975
At the beginning of 1975Australia maintained diplomatic relations 
with the four nation states of Indochina and was providing developmental 
aid to these countries. The diversification o f Australia’s relations with 
Asia, following the election of the Whitlam Government in late 1972, was 
part o f W hitlam ’s belief that Australian foreign policy should not be 
restricted due to ideological and military considerations, but should also 
include cultural and economic facets, and that Australia should seek to 
expand its relations within the Asian region.
As part o f the desire to restructure Australia’s foreign relations, 
an important initiative of the Whitlam Government was the formal 
abolition o f the White Australia Policy and the adoption of a policy of 
multiculturalism initiated by the Minister for Immigration, MrAl Grassby. 
The W hite Australia Policy was the common name given to the 
Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which sought to restrict non Anglo-
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Celtic immigrants from entering Australia. The historical background to 
this Act is similar to that of comparable regulations enacted in Canada 
and the USA during the latter part o f the nineteenth century. There were 
some provisions within the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which 
permitted some Asian people to immigrate to Australia, though then- 
numbers were very small.
Since the end o f the Second World W ar there had been a growing 
awareness on the part o f some Australians that Australia’s restrictions 
on non Anglo-Celtic immigration were presenting a negative image of 
Australia internationally and hampering Australia’s effectiveness in 
international forums. Upon its election the Whitlam Government moved 
rapidly to formally abolish the White Australia Policy, which resulted in 
a marginal increase in the proportion of Asian-born immigrants settling 
in Australia during the early years of government. However, the first 
significant test for the non-discriminatory nature of Australia’s new 
immigration policy was to come with the first Indochinese refugee crisis 
o f early 1975.
In the spring of 1975 Whitlam perceived that Australia was not 
in a position to accept Indochinese refugees, and was in essence 
unwilling to grant entry to Cambodian and even Vietnamese nationals 
with Australian connections. This perception arose due to a number of 
factors. The Labor Party in Australia at the time was more ideologically 
aligned with the North Vietnamese Government, as well as the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge and the 
Pathet Lao factions, than the American-backed regimes in Indochina. At 
the same time, some o f those involved in the labour movement expressed 
concern at the possibility o f having a large number o f Vietnamese 
workers in Australia, which could threaten the level o f wages of Australian 
workers, and thus the welfare o f Australian society. The Government 
was concerned at a possible electoral backlash from both conservative 
forces in society and its own supporters if Indochinese evacuees and 
refugees were settled permanently in Australia.
During April 1975 the Australian Labor Government did not plan 
to follow the US example o f extracting Cambodian and Vietnamese 
nationals who had connections with Australia or who were perceived as 
being at risk after the communist victories. The Whitlam Government, 
and especially some of its senior ministers, appeared concerned with two 
issues at this time: the desire not to offend North Vietnam by seeming 
to meddle in the internal affairs of South Vietnam through accepting 
Vietnamese nationals fleeing the advancing communist forces: and 
concern at permitting the entry of a large number of conservative South 
Vietnamese who it was felt might seek to disrupt Australia’s relations 
with North Vietnam. By the time the communist forces had entered 
Saigon less than a hundred Vietnamese nationals had arrived in 
Australia from Vietnam under special consideration. Up to the end of 
April 1975 the Whitlam Government’s inaction in getting the remaining
88 JcunejE . Cougblan
families of Vietnamese already in Australia out o f South Vietnam, prior 
to the communist take over, brought it substantial criticism from the 
opposition political parties, humanitarian organisations, some academics 
and the general community.
A fter the com munist forces entered Saigon the W hitlam  
Government experienced a substantial amount of condemnation, both 
domestically and internationally, directed at its lack of response in 
bringing out South Vietnamese nationals with Australian connections. 
The Whitlam  Government had incorrectly interpreted the general feeling 
o f the population towards the situation o f the Vietnamese in Australia, 
and underestimated the international criticisms it would be subject to. 
Australia soon came under pressure from the United States and the 
ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore, to participate in 
resettling some of the 130,000 American-assisted evacuees and refugees 
who had fled Cambodia and Vietnam. As a result of this pressure, two 
immigration officials were sent to Guam, Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore to interview evacuees and refugees for entry to Australia. At 
the end o f this exercise in m id-1975 just over one thousand Vietnamese 
were selected for entry into Australia. This token response was not 
received enthusiastically both domestically and internationally, and was 
viewed by some Asian countries as an indication that the White Australia 
Policy was not dead and buried as the Whitlam Government had 
announced, while in certain domestic quarters it added to the growing 
public discontent with the Whitlam Government. However, the domestic 
political situation within Australia was about to change and by the end 
of 1975 the Whitlam Government had been sacked by the Governor- 
General, Sir John Kerr, and a new conservative (Liberal) Government 
under Malcolm Fraser had been elected.
In summary, the position of the Whitlam Government towards 
the Indochinese evacuees and refugees in early 1975 was that it did not 
wish to offend and damage relations with, the newly victorious government 
of North Vietnam. However, after a significant amount of domestic and 
international pressure, mainly from the ASEAN countries and the United 
States, the Government acquiesced and accepted a token number of 
Indochinese evacuees and refugees. The policy towards the Indochinese 
refugees during 1975 was initially determined by some powerful members 
o f the Whitlam Government, who largely ignored the requests o f domestic 
and international pressure groups. The views of some other Government 
members who thought that Australia should do something to assist the 
evacuees and refugees were largely ignored.
The Fraser Government’s Initiatives: 1976— 1983
The first concerted attempt to develop a refugee policy within the 
framework of overall immigration policy came in 1977 under the Fraser 
Government at the instigation of the then Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs, Michael MacKellar. In the formulation of an Indochinese
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refugee policy the task at hand was to balance various domestic and 
international considerations, while at the same time attempting to 
project to the international community, especially the Asian region, the 
image of Australia as a responsible member of the Asian-Pacific 
community. The Fraser Government, like the Whitlam Government 
before it, recognised the importance of developing more substantial 
relations with Australia’s Asian neighbours.
During the late 1970s an important feature of the development 
of refugee policy within the overall immigration programme was the 
formal structural incorporation of the then Department of Foreign 
Affairs, now the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, into refugee 
policy formulation. Though the Department of Foreign Affairs had had 
input into Australia’s ad hoc refugee policy determination previously, 
there was no particular section within the Department which had 
responsibility for this matter. As an aside, it is important to note that 
since the onset of the Indochinese refugee phenomenon the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade has consistently recommended a higher 
intake of Indochinese refugees than the Department o f Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade believed that if Australia resettled a large number of Indochinese 
refugees, then it followed that Australia would be perceived as being a 
responsible member of the Asian region, and this perception in turn 
could be used as a tool by Australia to improve its regional relations with 
the Asian countries, especially the ASEAN countries, and, probably most 
importantly, Indonesia. As a result o f the perceived importance o f the 
Indochinese refugees in Australia’s bilateral and multilateral relations, 
a “refugee section” was established in the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in early 1981.
In addition to raising Australia’s status and prestige within the 
Asian region, another matter which also prompted the Australian 
Government to take a more active role in the Indochinese refugee issue 
was the arrival o f just over two thousand Vietnamese boat people in 51 
boats on Australia’s northern shores during 1976-1981, the largest 
proportion arriving between 1978-1979. The arrival o f these refugees 
sparked a heated debate in Australia, and in some quarters old fears of 
an Asian invasion of Australia resurfaced. The Government was concerned 
with these unannounced arrivals for two reasons: fear o f the domestic 
political backlash if increasing numbers of boat people were to arrive 
unannounced in Australia, and the problem posed by genuine refugees 
who would have to be resettled by Australia, although they would not 
have been selected via normal migration procedures. The latter issue 
was of concern to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs as 
Australia normally accepts the majority of its immigrants before they 
enter Australia: in selecting refugees outside of Australia immigration 
officials had the ability to select refugees who, they thought, would be 
able to integrate successfully into Australian society. This power of
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selection was not available in the case of genuine refugees who landed 
in Australia without prior selection, and thus the element o f controlled 
selection was absent.
As a result of the unannounced arrival ofVietnamese boat people 
on Australia’s northern shores, the Government made special advances 
to the Indonesian Government in an effort to persuade the Indonesians 
to hold any Vietnamese boat people who wanted to travel on to Australia. 
If this request was met, Australia promised to take a greater number of 
Vietnamese boat people from Indonesian camps. Similar advances were 
made to the Malaysian Government, and in m id-1978 the Australian 
Government approached the US Government and requested their 
assistance in persuading the Indonesian and Malaysian Governments to 
slop boats ofVietnamese refugees planning to go to Australia, in return 
for Australia taking more refugees from Indonesian and Malaysian 
refugee camps. This action would thus help the United States resettle 
Indochinese refugees, while at the same time reducing the number of 
refugees in Indonesia and Malaysia, but most importantly it would 
permit Australian immigration officials the opportunity to select the 
refugees Australia wanted to resettle. In early 1979 when the Indonesian 
Government offered two islands as possible sites for an Indochinese 
refugee processing centre, the Australian Government was immediately 
supportive of this proposal and offered to meet part o f the cost of 
establishing such a centre.
The Australian position in 1978-80 was essentially to tiy  to stop 
Vietnamese boat people from coming directly to Australia by accepting 
a large proportion of its Indochinese refugee intake from the countries 
from where the Vietnamese boat people would most likely attempt to 
continue their journey to Australia, viz. Indonesia and Malaysia. During 
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the refugee camp populations in 
Indonesia and Malaysia were declining, and those in Hong Kong and 
Thailand increasing, Australia continued to take the majority o f its 
refugees from Indonesia and Malaysia, with most of the intake from the 
other Asian countries consisting only of those refugees who had immediate 
family members in Australia who were in a position to sponsor them out 
of the refugee camps.
During the late 1970s, despite what it perceived as its adequate 
response to the growing Indochinese refugee crisis, the Fraser Government 
came under increasing international pressure from the first asylum 
ASEAN countries, as well as the USA and the office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to resettle more of the growing 
number o f Indochinese asylum seekers arriving in Asian first asylum 
countries. On the domestic scene, the growing media coverage of the 
plight of the Vietnamese boat people and the horrific images of emaciated 
Cambodians entering Thailand raised public consciousness and 
sympathy, thus permitting the Government, now also under increasing 
domestic pressure, to raise more readily its intake quota of Indochinese 
refugees.
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Also in the late 1970s the Vietnamese boat people situation 
changed markedly with the arrival o f a number oflarge freighters in Asia 
with thousands o f Vietnamese asylum seekers aboard. It soon became 
apparent that the maj ority of people on these freighters had paid the local 
equivalent of thousands of dollars to leave Vietnam, and that their 
departure from Vietnam had been arranged with the assistance of 
corrupt Vietnamese Government officials. With the growing number of 
Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving on the shores of Asian countries the 
Australian Government, mirroring the US Government, announced in 
early 1982 that it would examine each asylum seeker’s claim for refugee 
status on a case-by-case basis, rather than giving refugee status to all 
Indochinese asylum seekers. Shortly after the arrival of the large 
freighters in southeast Asia a new term began to be bandied around— 
the “economic refugee”. At this time for many resettlement countries it 
became fairly clear that a sizable proportion of Indochinese asylum 
seekers, especially amongst the Vietnamese boat people, had fled their 
countries for economic rather than political reasons, and thus were at 
best economic, rather than political, refugees.
Also in 1982 the Australian Government took the first immigrants 
from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) which was 
initiated in 1979 following negotiations between the Government of the 
Socialist Republic ofVietnam and the UNHCR. Unlike in the United States, 
all Vietnamese leaving Vietnam under this programme, which in Australia 
is now termed the “Vietnamese Family Migration Programme”, entered 
Australia as immigrants and not as refugees. The almost three year delay 
between the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
UNHCR and the Vietnamese Government, and the first arrival in Australia 
of emigrants from Vietnam under the ODP was due to the finalisation of 
procedural matters. However, it should be noted that between 1976 and 
1982 several hundred Vietnamese nationals were able to emigrate from 
Vietnam to Australia under normal migration channels, although it 
should be noted also that the majority of these people had been given 
entry visas to Australia prior to 30 April 1975.
During the late 1970s under the Fraser Government, Australia’s 
principal goals with respect to the Indochinese asylum seekers were: 
firstly to improve Australia’s image internationally, especially with the 
ASEAN countries: and secondly, to act to prevent adverse domestic 
opinion which arose each time Vietnamese boat people arrived 
unannounced on Australian shores. When reports began to emerge in 
the late 1970s that boats carrying Vietnamese refugees had been pushed 
off from the shores of some of the ASEAN countries, the Australian 
Government did not publicly condemn these actions as strongly as did 
other Western governments, and indicated that the problem was with 
the Vietnamese Government, and that the international community 
should be more understanding of the difficult position of the developing 
ASEAN countries. Such action on the part of the Fraser Government was
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to indicate its condemnation of the Vietnamese Government and support 
o f ASEAN’s position on the boat people, which would assist in improving 
Australia’s relations with the nations o f the region. The adoption o f this 
position was to ensure also that Vietnamese boat people would be 
prevented from arriving in Australia unannounced, and would ensure 
that the Fraser Government acquired both domestic and international 
benefit. The Fraser Government took account of both domestic and 
international factors in determining its Indochinese refugee policies, 
while at the same time approaching the issue with some semblance of 
humanitarianism.
The Hawke Government's Disengagement: 1983-1990
By the m id-1980s the world’s attention had drifted away from the 
plight o f the Vietnamese boat people and the Cambodian refugees along 
the Thailand-Cambodia border. The world’s media had not bothered 
about the situation of the Lao and Hmong refugees in Thailand. 
America’s war in Laos has been labelled a “secret war” and thus very few 
people in the W est knew about the existence of Laos or America’s military 
involvement there in the early 1960s. At the same time, the principal 
Indochinese refugee resettlement countries of Australia, Canada, France 
and theU SAbeganto experience what hasbecome known as compassion 
fatigue, their desire to resettle enthusiastically, an apparently never 
ending stream of Indochinese asylum seekers, especially Vietnamese 
boat people, waned significantly. This decreased enthusiasm may be 
measured by a gradual decline in each country’s Indochinese refugee 
quota or ceiling. Australia was not an exception to the gradual 
disengagement of resettling Indochinese refugees. However, through its 
then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and now Governor-General, Bill 
Hayden, Australia strongly sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict 
in Cambodia, which was perceived as an important first step in the 
resolution of the Indochinese refugee problem. Indeed, from the late 
1970s to the mid 1980s the situation o f the Indochinese refugees had 
moved from a crisis to a problem that refused to go away.
In its desire to play a leading active role in seeking a settlement 
to the Cambodian problem, and in an effort to obtain substantial 
regional support for its initiatives, Australia accepted fewer Indochinese 
refugees, but the proportional decrease in the Australian intake was not 
as high as that of the other principal resettlement countries. A  policy of 
gradual disengagement was implemented in order to use the Indochinese 
refugee issue in discussions on the Cambodian situation with the ASEAN 
countries. In an effort to be in a favourable position to take the initiative 
in the resolution o f the Cambodian problem the newly elected Labor 
Government, under Prime Minister Robert Hawke, decided in 1983, 
under a recommendation o f the Department of Foreign Affairs, to resettle 
a greater proportion of Indochinese refugees from Thailand, where the 
majority o f the Indochinese refugees were to be found.
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Another of the Hawke Government’s principal foreign policy 
objectives was to substantially improve relations with Vietnam, while at 
the same time strengthening relations with the other Asian countries. 
Both o f these objectives were achieved over the following seven years, 
though it is important to note that Australia’s initiatives towards both 
improving relations with Vietnam and seeking a solution to the Cambodian 
conflict, somewhat damaged relations with the ASEAN countries, 
especially during 1984-1986. Another damaging issue was what has 
come to be called the Asian Immigration Debate, or, the Blainey Debate, 
so-called after the Melbourne University historian. Professor Geoffrey 
Blainey, who initiated the debate in March 1984.
The very emotional, public Asian Immigration Debate was 
essentially about the perceived high level o f Asian immigration to 
Australia. During most of the 1980s about 35-40 per cent o f Australia’s 
annual immigrant intake was comprised of Asian-bom  immigrants, a 
level which some Australians perceived as being too high. One of the 
international repercussions of this debate, which was widely reported in 
the Asian media, was that Australia was again being perceived as a racist 
country, and the notion of the officially defunct White Australia Policy 
was mentioned occasionally in the Asian media. The debate on the level 
o f Asian immigration has waxed and waned since 1984, though the 
damage done to Australia’s image in Asia was perceived to be substantial 
enough to warrant action. One initiative taken was to maintain the 
intake o f Indochinese refugees at a reasonable level, while concurrently 
not changing immigration policy in effect to decrease the overall level of 
Asian immigration to Australia. Such action was perceived by the 
Government as demonstrating to Asian countries that Australia was not 
racist, and was still willing to resettle Indochinese refugees at a fairly 
constant level at a time when other resettlement countries were reducing 
their intake o f Indochinese refugees. This action together with Australia’s 
reaching a consensus with the ASEAN countries on the Cambodia 
conflict assisted in Australia regaining its influence in the ASEAN region, 
indicating as they did that its initiatives on the Cambodian conflict were 
for the benefit of the Asian region and demonstrating that Australia was 
not a racist country.
Partly as a result of the Asian Immigration Debate and other 
domestic factors a non Government committee was convened in late 
1987 to report to the Government on future directions for Australia’s 
immigration policies. The Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration 
Policies, which was chaired by Dr Stephen Fitzgerald, Australia’s first 
ambassador to the People’s Republic o f China and an internationally 
renowned Sinologist, reported to the Government in m id-1988. One of 
the reports recommendations was that Australia should gradually 
d isengage its e lf from  Indoch inese refugee resettlem en t. Th is  
recommendation appears to have derived from a negative image of 
Indochinese, especially Vietnamese, refugees in Australia and agrow ing
94 James E . Cougblan
opposition to ongoing Indochinese refugee resettlement within the 
Department o f Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs. 
However, the Hawke Government was quick to indicate that it would not 
follow this recommendation, a decision which was taken in response to 
substantial pressure from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
During the late 1980s Australia began working very closely with 
the ASEAN countries on a solution to the Cambodia conflict. Associated 
with a resolution o f this conflict was the Indochinese asylum seekers 
issue. By early 1989 Australia had essentially reached a consensus with 
the ASEAN countries both on the method of resolving the Cambodian 
conflict and the problem of the Indochinese asylum seekers. During 
1989-1990 Australia continued to liaise closely with the ASEAN countries 
on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. At the July 1989 Geneva 
conference on Indochinese asylum seekers Australia, with the ASEAN 
countries, voted “for" the mandatory repatriation of Vietnamese asylum 
seekers, opposing the Governments of the United States, the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam. During subsequent international meetings on the 
issue of the Indochinese asylum seekers, Australia and the ASEAN 
countries continued to oppose the United States on the issue of 
mandatory repatriation o f Vietnamese asylum seekers.
An important outcome o f the July 1989 Geneva conference was 
that Australia committed itself to resettling 11,000 long-term Vietnamese 
boat people during 1989-1992. This initiative came from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, not the Department o f Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs. While this decision obviously pleased 
the ASEAN countries, as well as Hong Kong, not all sections of the 
Vietnamese community, and some of those involved with resettling 
Indochinese refugees, are pleased with this decision. Currently most of 
those providing services to the Indochinese communities have severely 
over-burdened work loads, and the prospect o f settling 11,000 long-term 
refugees, the majority of whom have been in camps for over five years and 
do not have relatives in Australia, is daunting.
In late 1989 a new problem appeared on the horizon o f Australia’s 
Indochinese refugee programme; a boat load of Cambodian asylum 
seekers landed on Australian shores, and by m id-1990 two additional 
boatloads had arrived. Australia was quick to dispatch envoys to 
Indonesia in an attempt to persuade the Indonesian Government to hold 
any Cambodian boat people who sought asylum in Australia. With an 
increasing number o f Cambodian and Vietnamese boat people arriving 
on Indonesian shores, many o f whom have been pushed off from 
Malaysia, and a decreasing number of refugees being resettled in third 
countries, there is little incentive for the Indonesian Government to hold 
Indochinese boat people headed for Australia, as it has done in the past. 
At present, there are also strong indications that Australia will stop 
accepting refugees from Laos (as of September 1990). Australia's decision 
to resettle 11,000 long-term Vietnamese boat people during 1989-1992 
may end up causing more problems than it solves for the Government.
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Since the Hawke Government came to office in 1983 Australia’s 
policy on the Indochinese asylum seekers has been very closely associated 
with the desire to find a solution to the Cambodian conflict and improve 
relations with Asia, especially the newly industrialising ASEAN countries. 
Despite growing domestic opposition to resettling more Indochinese 
refugees, both on the part of the public and from with in some Government 
departments, Australia’s annual intake o f Indochinese refugees has 
remained around 6-7,000 persons per annum for most o f the life o f the 
Hawke Governm ent. During th is tim e, in ternational po litica l 
considerations have been the paramount driving force behind Australia’s 
Indochinese refugee policy, with domestic and humanitarian factors 
being seemingly less important over time.
Discussion and Conclusion
The changes in Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy since early 
1975 have been influenced by a variety o f international and domestic 
political considerations. On the domestic side such factors as community 
attitudes to the acceptance of the Indochinese refugees, the general 
economic situation and various public debates relating to immigration 
in general, and since 1984 Asian immigration in particular, have been 
of concern. Internationally, Australia’s response to the Indochinese 
refugee problem has been based on developments in the three Indochinese 
countries, the refugee situation in the Asian countries of first asylum, 
the attitudes of the other principal Indochinese refugee resettlement 
countries, especially Canada and the USA and the subsequent pressure 
placed on the Australian Government by the Governments of the US and 
the ASEAN countries. Since the mid-1980s the perceived damage done 
to Australia’s reputation in Asia as result o f the widely reported Asian 
immigration debates in the Asian media has also been a factor for 
consideration. Thus the determination of Australia’s Indochinese refugee 
policy has had to take into account a complex, and at times contradictory, 
set o f international and domestic considerations, often with the strength 
of the international factors out-weighing the politically sensitive and 
potentially damaging domestic considerations. Indeed, it may be said 
that there were times when the Australian Government’s Indochinese 
refugee policy was in direct confrontation with domestic political 
considerations. At the same time, Australia’s policy towards the 
Indochinese refugees, especially the Vietnamese boat people, has been 
diametrically opposed to Australia’s refugee philosophy and other 
aspects of the government’s overall immigration policies.
Australia’s apparent reluctance to take Cambodian, Hmong and 
Lao refugees extended from a belief that the majority o f these refugees 
were o f rural or unskilled backgrounds, and thus would find it nearly 
impossible to integrate into industrial and post-industrial Australian 
society. Those refugees from Cambodia and Laos who would have been 
suited for resettlement in Australia, that is the educated and the skilled, 
were perceived as probably having a knowledge of French rather than
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English, and thus would be more suitable for resettlement in Canada or 
France. There was a perception also that the majority of the Vietnamese 
boat people were from the urban localities in southern Vietnam, and 
thus would be able to integrate readily into Australian society. It was also 
the opinion of some policy makers that refugees from Cambodia and 
Laos would be willing to return to their homelands once the economic 
and political situations in these countries stabilised. Not only was this 
position all too vague, but it also exhibited a lack o f understanding of the 
complex socio-historical situations in these two countries, especially 
with respect to Laos.
The country of origin of the refugees to be selected was the 
subject o f discussions, as well as strong disagreements, between the 
Department o f Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs and 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The acceptance o f many of 
the Cambodian refugees in the early to m id-1980s appears to be a victory 
for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as the Department of 
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs perceived that the 
Cambodians, as well as the Lao, were largely uninlegratable due to their 
poor level o f human capital. From an economic perspective these 
perceptions were to be proven wrong, as data from the 1986 Australian 
Census o f Population and Housing indicated that Lao-Australians were 
the most economically successful of the Indochinese refugee communities, 
with the Cambodian-Australians only marginally less successful than 
the Vietnamese-Australians.
The decision to select Indochinese refugees from specific first 
asylum countries was determined by a complex set o f economic, 
geopolitical and historical factors, foreign governmental pressure and 
perceptions of which refugees would most readily integrate into Australian 
society. Under international pressure in the mid-1970s, primarily from 
the UNHCR and the US Government, Australia accepted the majority of 
its Indochinese refugees from Thailand. With the commencement o f the 
major exodus of Vietnamese boat people in 1978 Australia started taking 
a large number o f refugees from Malaysia, again mainly due to 
international pressure and Australia’s historical Commonwealth and 
military links with Malaysia. After a number of Vietnamese boats arrived 
on Australian shores in 1978-79 a significant proportion of the Indochinese 
refugee intake came from Indonesia. In the early 1980s, as international 
pressure mounted to assist the resettlement of the growing number of 
Cambodian refugees, Australia again redirected part o f its attention to 
Thailand, though Indonesia and Malaysia remained the main source of 
Indochinese refugees. These three countries were to continue through 
the 1980s asbeing the main source o f Indochinese refugees for Australia. 
From the beginning o f 1990 about 37 per cent of the Indochinese 
refugees resettled in Australia came from Malaysia, 30 per cent from 
Thailand (of which about one-third were Vietnamese), 16 per cent from 
Indonesia, six per cent from Hong Kong and four per cent from the 
Philippines.
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In the early 1980s Australia came under some criticism  for only 
taking the cream o f the refugees and rejecting the elderly and uneducated. 
Indeed this practice had been going on since the late 1970s, and for a 
short period during 1978-79 some Australian immigration officers 
working in Malaysia deliberately split families in order to select young 
single females for entry to Australia. A fter increasing criticism  of 
Australia’s acceptance procedures from some first asylum governments 
and Australian community groups actively involved in the resettlement 
of Indochinese refugees, the Government decided that a small proportion 
of the refugees to be resettled would be difficult to settle cases. However, 
the majority o f these difficult to settle cases had fam ily members in 
Australia who were able to assist with their resettlement.
In conclusion, the main driving force behind Australia ’s policy 
towards the Indochinese refugees over the past decade and a half has 
been international political considerations, especially based on the 
relations between the Australian Government and the ASEAN countries. 
However, the main factor limiting the level o f Australia’s response to the 
Indochinese refugee problem was domestic political considerations, 
especially the potential domestic political backlash if too many refugees 
were accepted. Only in a few instances have genuine humanitarian 
considerations come into play. This is highlighted even more when one 
considers the recent decision to accept 11,000 Vietnamese long-stayers 
from Asian refugee camps, at a time when domestic resettlement 
resources can ju st cope with those resettled in Australia, and when 
Australian unemployment is increasing and unemployment within the 
V ietnam ese-bom  community is in the order o f 30-35 per cent.
